Abstract-Current BitTorrent discovery methods rely on either centralised systems or structured peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. These methods present security weaknesses that can be exploited in order to censor or remove information from the network. To alleviate this threat, we propose incorporating an unstructured peer-to-peer information discovery mechanism that can be used in the event that the centralised or structured P2P mechanisms are compromised. Unstructured P2P information discovery has fewer security weaknesses. However, in this case, the performance of the search is nondeterministic since it is not practical to perform an exhaustive search. The search performance then strongly depends on the distribution of documents in the network. To determine the practicality of unstructured P2P search over BitTorrent, we first conducted a 64 day study of BitTorrent activities, looking at the distribution of 1.6 million torrents on 5.4 million peers. We found that the distribution of torrents follows a power law which is not amenable to unstructured search. To address this, we introduce a simple modification to BitTorrent which enables each peer to index a random subset of tracking data, i.e. the torrent ID and list of participating nodes. A successful search is then one that finds a peer with tracking data, rather than a peer directly participating in the torrent. The distribution of this tracking data is shown to be capable of supporting an accurate unstructured search for torrents. We assess the overheads introduced by our extension and conclude that we would require small amounts of bandwidth, that are easily provided by current home broadband capabilities. We also simulate our extension to verify our model and to explore our extension's capabilities in different situations. We demonstrate that our extension can satisfy PAC search queries for torrents, under network churn and complex node behaviours.
I. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
BitTorrent is a popular method of distributing multimedia content, software and other data. BitTorrent requires users to interact with a centralised service called the tracker. This central focus point is a potential security weakness for the protocol. Studies have shown tracker failure to be a common and disruptive occurrence [1] . Disrupting the tracker's service effectively halts the running of the BitTorrent network. In order to strengthen the network against attack, a distributed hash table (DHT) extension has been introduced and widely adopted. However, whilst this improves the security of BitTorrent, the DHT mechanism is also vulnerable to attack [2] , [3] . Information retrieval in an unstructured P2P network is more resistant to attacks attempting to censor information [4] . However, the accuracy of such search is both probabilistic and approximate since it is not practical to exhaustively search the entire network. Recent work on modelling probably approximately correct (PAC) search has provided a strong mathematical framework for modelling the search accuracy, i.e. the probability of finding a torrent [5] , [6] , [7] . To determine whether PAC search is feasible on the BitTorrent network, we first conducted a 64 day study of BitTorrent activities, looking at the distribution of 1.6 million torrents on 5.4 million peers. Our measurements show that the torrent distribution across nodes follows a power-law. Section III describes this work. We describe a node as participating in a torrent if it is downloading or uploading the torrent's data. In order for a PAC search to be successful, a search query must reach at least one node that is participating in the desired torrent. To improve the probability of a successful search, Section IV proposes a modification to the BitTorrent protocol such that, if a node receives a query for a torrent it is not participating in, it stores the torrent's ID, together with the address of the querying node. If the queried node then receives a subsequent query for this torrent, it responds with the address of the previous querying node(s). This modification substantially improves the probability of a successful search for a torrent in the network. Section IV provides a detailed analysis. Section V then considers the overheads associated with our modification of the BitTorrent protocol. Additional bandwidth is required in order to discover torrents and each node must provide a small amount of local storage for indexing purposes. We show that even under extreme conditions the overheads introduced by this extension are not prohibitive. Search queries cost between 6.8KB and 8.8KB and our extension requires only 6.9Kbytes of local storage per hour. In order to verify our model we run a series of simulations, described in Section VI. These simulations confirm our theoretical analysis. The simulations also consider various models of network churn in order to demonstrate the extension's effectiveness in real-world environments.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Several solutions to the problem of relying on a centralised tracking service have been explored by the BitTorrent community. The multi-tracker extension 1 to the protocol allows torrent authors to list more than one tracker URL in the .torrent file. If one tracker fails, the node can attempt to contact a second and is therefore less affected by individual tracker failure. HTTP 2 moves the tracking data from the tracker into a shared and distributed database. BitTorrent uses an implementation of a Kademlia DHT system [9] . Unfortunately, there are some side effects to this DHT implementation which may introduce new security concerns. For example, in [2] a Sybil attack, where many nodes are controlled by a single entity, is performed that successfully pollutes the DHT and manages to eclipse targeted torrents.
Probably approximately correct (PAC) search [7] is an information retrieval mechanism that operates over unstructured peer to peer networks. PAC search is a system that enables full-text search over a document collection. The collection is randomly distributed, with replication, around a network of nodes, each node holding a small fraction of the total collection in a local index. To perform a search, a node issues a query to a randomly sampled set of nodes. Each node applies the query to its local index and returns any matching documents. The results from all queried nodes are collated and duplicate results removed. If the resulting document set does not meet the search requirements the query can be re-issued to a newly sampled set of random nodes. There are three factors that influence the ability of a PAC search system to correctly retrieve a document, d i , namely (i) the number of nodes in the network, n, (ii) the number of nodes that index the document, r i , and (iii) the number of nodes contacted per query, z. A document can only appear in PAC search results if it is present in the local index of at least one of the z nodes that were queried. From [7] the probability, P (d i ), that document d i is present in at least one of the z local indexes is given by:
Information retrieval in unstructured networks is a wellresearched area. In [11] the authors study the performance of search using different replication strategies. They conclude that square-root replication, where documents are distributed over a number of nodes proportional to the square root of their popularity, provides the lowest expected search length. In [12] the authors introduce BubbleStorm, a system for search over unstructured peer-to-peer networks, similar to PAC search. BubbleStorm provides a gossiping algorithm that is very resilient to network churn and large numbers of node failure. In this paper we assume that a PAC search client is capable of randomly sampling nodes from the network. 5 http://bittorrent.org/beps/bep 0005.html
The are several methods to do so. BubbleStorm uses localview gossiping to achieve this. In [13] the authors consider using random walks over an unstructured networks to replace flooding found in systems such as Gnutella. In [14] the authors introduce Brahms, a system for random peer sampling in unstructured networks that uses another gossip-based protocol.
III. THE MEASUREMENT STUDY
In order to evaluate the applicability of PAC search to BitTorrent we conducted a measurement study of public BitTorrent networks. In order to evaluate PAC search over BitTorrent it is necessary to know: (i) how many nodes are in the network and (ii) how torrents are distributed over those nodes. The data was collected from public BitTorrent trackers discovered using the TrackOn 6 API. Each tracker was periodically polled with a scrape request. A scrape request asks the tracker to return a list of all of the torrents that it is tracking. For each torrent in the scraped list, the tracker was asked to list all of the nodes that were currently sharing that torrent's file. This process was initiated at most once an hour. In practise a complete scrape took much longer than an hour to complete so additional scrapes were only started when the previous finished. Nodes were identified by IP address, it was assumed that each unique IP address represents a unique node and that every node has a single, unchanging IP address. This means that we cannot tell the difference between nodes that operate behind network address translation (NAT), and so may, undercount the number of nodes. We also cannot detect when a node has had its IP address changed, this may lead to counting a single node more than once. We assume that these issues impact only slightly on our figures.
Between 1 st May and 3 rd July 2012, 13 public BitTorrent trackers were periodically scraped. A total of 1.6 million distinct torrents were observed on over 5.4 million distinct nodes over 64 days. Considering each torrent as a document in the collection, the number of documents, m = 1, 600, 000 and the number of nodes n = 5, 400, 000. A PAC search is heavily influenced by the distribution of torrents over the nodes. In order to determine this distribution, the number of nodes registered to each torrent was counted. The frequencies at which these counts were observed was then calculated. Figure 1 shows these frequencies on a log-log scale, along with a line of best fit. The distribution follows a power law with the vast majority of torrents being found on very few nodes. These figures align with those observed in [15] , [16] . The analysis shows that 25% of all torrents are only found on a single node and 76% of all torrents are found on 10 or fewer. Only 2% of observed torrents were found on more than 100 nodes. Torrents were found on anywhere between 0 and 21,445 nodes, the average torrent was owned by 27 nodes and the median torrent by 3. However, from Equation 1, for a required probability of finding a document, P (d i ) = 0.8 when querying z = 500 nodes, we need a document to be replicated on r i = 17, 354 nodes. We only observed 9 torrents with a replication at or above this level.
IV. THE PAC BITTORRENT EXTENSION
Our extension enables PAC search in the following manner. A node wishing to find a torrent performs a PAC search over 13- the nodes, providing a torrent's ID. Each queried node looks for the torrent in its local index and returns a list of any associated peers. Querying a node for a torrent causes the queried node to add the torrent and querying node to its local index. The success of PAC search is then dependent on the distribution of torrent tracking data, rather than the distribution of the torrents themselves. Our modification is based on the following assumptions. First, we assume that a querying node is able to sample and communicate with z uniformly random nodes in the network. Second, we assume that a querying node will persist in communicating with nodes until the search is successful. Thus, when a node performs a search it issues queries for the torrent, until a query is successful.
A query consists of a node sending a request to z randomly sampled nodes in the network. Each repeated query for the same torrent selects z different nodes. A request consists of a querying node sending the torrent's ID to a random node. The queried node responds with either a list of nodes it believes are participating in the torrent, or an empty list. When querying a fixed number of random nodes, z, the probability of a successful query is determined by (i) the number of nodes participating in the torrent, and (ii) the number of nodes indexing the torrent's tracking data. Given our proposed modification to the BitTorrent protocol, the more queries the network receives for a torrent, the more that torrent's tracking data is replicated, and the easier it becomes to find. The number, r(t), of nodes indexing a torrent at a time t depends on (i) the number, u, of requests made for the torrent per unit time, and (ii) the proportion, c, of nodes that leave the network per unit time. The change in replication over time can be expressed as:
Here, 1 − r(t) n gives the proportion of the z nodes that were not already indexing the torrent. Eqn 3 gives the replication of a torrent's tracking data as a function of time. It depends on a number of parameters; c, the network churn rate, u the torrent query rate, z the query size, and n the network size. Both n and c are constants defined by the network and so are not controllable. The number of nodes queried, z, can be controlled on a network-wide, torrent-wide, or individual level. The torrent query rate, u, can be increased by having nodes that are already participating in the torrent issue extra queries for the torrent. These "dummy" queries have the effect of informing the randomly queried nodes, that the torrent can be found on the querying node. We see that r(t) approaches a limit of un (1+z) uz+cn at an exponential rate. After some small t, therefore, we can consider r(t) to be stable, with negligible deviation from the limit. In the following discussion we assume n = 5000000 and c = 0.06 7 . If a torrent receives u = 100 queries per unit time then Eqn (1) tells us that P (d i ) = 0.96 when z = 100. If we instead have that u = 50 when z = 100 then P (d i ) = 0.81, if u = 100 when z = 50 then P (d i ) = 0.57. Note that even when P (d i ) = 0.57 the expected number of repeated queries required before success is only 1.75. Figure 2 shows the relationship between z and u for three different values of P (d i ) = 0.5, 0.7, 0.9. We conclude that reasonable strategies for z and u can be picked. If the torrent is popular (with high u) then low values of z will easily provide the probability required. If the torrent is not popular (low u), as the majority of the torrents we observed were, then high probabilities can still be achieved by either setting z higher or by having the small number of participating nodes issue dummy queries to seed the network with information as to where the torrent can be found.
The above analysis assumed that the replication had reached a stable point. We now explore what happens before the stable point is reached. The initial replication, r(0), is set by the authoring node and controls the probability of finding the torrent early in its lifetime. The authoring node can control r(0) by issuing dummy queries to random nodes in the network. Each queried node returns a null list but now knows the location of the torrent. Thus, r(0) sets a minimum probability of successful query. For example, if the desired minimum were P (d i ) = 0.1, n = 5000000, and z = 100 then, from Eqn 1, we need to set r(0) = 5265. Note that the issuing of dummy queries by the authoring node can be done over hours or days and should not constitute a significant drain on resources.
V. THE OVERHEADS
The BitTorrent extension described in the previous section introduces a number of overheads. The introduction of an additional index at each node requires additional local storage space. Discovery of tracking data is achieved by having nodes make requests to other nodes. This requirement increases 7 In [17] , [18] 10 .
For a node to send a single query it will contact z other nodes, and receive a response from all of them. The cost, in bytes, to send a query is z(64 + 68) = 132z. An empty response costs 64 + 4 = 68 bytes. A successful response costs 64 + 4 + 6a = 68 + 6a bytes, where a is the number of results returned. For simplicity, we consider the cases where a = 1, 10, or 100. We expect zr(t) n of the requests to be successful. Assuming the network is in steady state, we have that receiving responses will cost z(68 + 6au(1+z) cn+uz ) bytes. Using an example from Section IV, if z = 100, u = 100, n = 5000000 and c = 0.06 then we see that a single node sending a single query will send 13,200 bytes of data and receive an expected 6.8Kbytes when a = 1 and 8.8Kbytes when a = 100.
An authoring node wishing to bootstrap a torrent into the network will send requests for the torrent until a minimum probability of successful query is met. If we assume z = 100 and n = 5000000 then from Eqn 1, P (d i ) = 0.1 requires r(0) = 5265 and P (d i ) = 0.5 requires r(0) = 34538. Sending requests to meet these baselines would cost the author 700Kbytes and 4.559Mbytes respectively.
In order for searches to be successful, queried nodes must respond to requests. In [15] the authors observe that the average BitTorrent node will perform q = 1.33 searches every hour. We can estimate the number of requests generated by the entire network every hour as qzns, where s is the average number of times a query must be repeated before success. As an example, we assume s = 2, i.e. the probability of a successful query is 50%. Each individual node will receive an expected qzns n of the total. If we use, as in previous examples, z = 100, then we would expect each node to receive 266 requests per hour. Therefore the cost of responding to requests is 266(68 + 6a) bytes per hour. The cost of receiving requests is 132 * 266 bytes per hour. We estimate that our extension therefore requires 78 bits/sec in download bandwidth and between 44 and 396 bits/sec in upload bandwidth, amounts easily provided, given current home broadband capabilities.
Each node must keep a local index of torrents and nodes. If we assume a worst case scenario where each received request is for a distinct torrent, then each item in the index will require 26 bytes. If, as above, we assume that a node will receive 266 requests per hour then a node's local index will increase in size at a rate of 6916 bytes/hour and will reach 1GB after 144,593 hours, or 16.5 years of continuous use. This assumes that a node will never remove items from its index. It is more likely that a node will keep the index at a constant, acceptable size.
VI. THE SIMULATIONS
In order to evaluate our extension we ran several simulations of BitTorrent networks. We simulated complex node behaviour according to the fluid model developed in [19] , [17] , we set γ = 0.016, θ = 0.025 and λ = 0.03. Each node can download a maximum of 10% of the torrent per hour and upload 1%. Each network was kept at a constant 5 million nodes, when a node left, it was replaced. Each simulation ran for at least 450 simulated hours. We ran a PAC search for a single torrent over each simulated network using a query size of z = 100. We re-ran each simulation until we obtained at least a 5% confidence level in our statistics. We ran three types of simulation for different node behaviours. The first considered torrents whose participation level is constant over a long period of time, new nodes join a torrent as old ones leave. In [20] , constant torrent participation is observed. We simulated torrents with participation at 1000, 100, and 10 nodes. Figure 3 shows how P (d i ) changes over time for a torrent with 100 participating nodes. As expected, with a constant query rate we observe a steady probability. When the participation is set to 10 nodes out of 5 million we observe an average probability of a successful query of 14.26%, each node, on average, sent 8 queries before success. When 1000 nodes participate, the average probability of finding the torrent after a single query to 100 nodes is 88%. On average, such a torrent is known to 101,891 nodes.
The second set of simulations explores torrents with fixed participation. Where new nodes never join the torrent but old nodes also never leave. Again we consider torrents with 1000, 100, and 10 participating nodes and Figure 3 shows P (d i ) for torrents with 100. We observe that the probability declines steadily, dropping between 11.55 and 28.51 percentage points over the 450 hours of the simulation. We conclude that if a torrent's participating nodes remain in the network then our extension is reasonably resilient to churn. This is because each participating node will have replicated tracking data that will never become incorrect. If these nodes wished to stabilise the probability of discovering their torrents then they could make dummy requests to counteract the loss of replication due to network churn. For participation levels of 1000, 100, and 10 on average as few as 181, 46, and 15 dummy requests per hour would have to be made respectively.
The final type of simulation considers torrents that exhibit a flash-crowd effect. We used the fluid model from [19] , [17] to simulate this. We simulate three types of torrent; torrents whose participation peaks at 10,000 nodes; 1000 nodes; and 100 nodes. Figure 3 shows P (d i ) for a torrent with a peak 1,000 participating nodes. Under this model the probability of successful query peaks with the participation and so is greatest when the most queries are being performed. For this reason the average probability of a successful query is 99.06% for torrents that peak at 10,000 nodes, 78.61% for torrents that peak at 1000, and 25.68% for torrents that peak at 100. This is despite seemingly long tail of lower probabilities for each curve. The average number of queries required before success was 6 for the worst performing curve, meaning that even if a node is searching for a torrent whose participation never exceeds 100 nodes in 5 million, only 6 queries are expected to be required before success.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The security weaknesses of the BitTorrent protocol are well known. Improvements to the protocol have been made to alleviate this issue. However, even the DHT-based extensions have proven susceptible to attack. Since unstructured networks are usually more resistant to attack, this paper investigated the feasibility of a probabilistic (PAC) search to discover torrents. The performance of PAC search is strongly dependent of the number of nodes queried and the distribution of torrents in the network. A two month study of the distribution of torrents across nodes showed a power law distribution that is not amenable to PAC search. To address this issue we proposed a modification of the BitTorrent protocol such that each node in the network now indexes a random subset of tracking data. Each node's local database is independently constructed by recording the torrent ID, together with the IP address of the querying node. A subsequent analysis of the distribution of tracking data revealed that the tracking data is replicated sufficiently to support a PAC search. Moreover, the communication and storage overheads associated with the modified protocol were shown to be small. Thus, no degradation in performance of BitTorrent is expected. Simulations were performed on a network of 5 million nodes under a variety of torrent query rates and churn rates. The simulation results support our theoretical analysis. We envision that PAC search could be used to complement rather than replace existing torrent discovery mechanisms. Given the security concerns raised by the current BitTorrent extensions we imagine our system to be most useful in a Byzantine environment. There are a number of directions for future work. These include (i) developing a mechanism to adaptively select the number of nodes queried based on the popularity of the queried torrent, and (ii) developing a mechanism for nodes participating in a torrent to adaptively issue dummy queries so that a torrent's tracking data is sufficiently replicated to guarantee that the probability of a successful search is high.
